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This paper will shed light on twice Chilean Presidente Carlos Ibáñez’s life from 
the moment he left for exile after his first administration (1927-1931), until his return in 
1937. With the notable exceptions, scholars have focused little attention on the period 
and Ibáñez himself. This research reconstructs Ibáñez’s tortuous life during this period 
using mainly his personal archive and memoirs of politicians of the time, providing an 
unexpected understanding of Ibáñez himself and this period of Chilean history. What 
emerged from both Ibáñez’s personal letters and those of others is that, even though he 
had fallen into apparent disgrace and even in spite of himself, Ibáñez continued to be a 
destabilizing force to the political system. 
The first part deals with the problems that Ibáñez had to face after he left power, 
the failures of his political project, and the attacks on his former administration’s 
achievements, until the overthrow of Juan Esteban Montero’s government. The second 
part deals with the political turmoil of 1932, how Ibáñez tried to accommodate to the 
 v 
political circumstances of the socialist republic, and how he tried to reposition himself in 
the political arena. A third section shows how Ibáñez resigned himself to the triumph of 
his fiercest political opponent, Arturo Alessandri, who won the 1932 presidential 
elections. He had to accept that he would be unable to return in the near future to Chile 
and he would have to rebuild a life in Buenos Aires. When after six complicated years 
Ibáñez returned to the country by mid-1937, he was more politically mature, and 
certainly more experienced. 
Analysis of Ibáñez´s exile suggests a new way of understanding Latin American 
politics. His absence from Chile played a fundamental role. Either out of fear or out of 
respect, the different political factions played with his “absence,” making him a somehow 
invisible actor. Throughout, he worried about keeping up to date and staying in constant 
contact with many of the main actors and events of the Chilean politics. For his 
opponents and supporters, he was and still is a liminal figure for conceptualizing Chilean 
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FAR AWAY YET SO CLOSE: CARLOS IBÁÑEZ´S EXILE IN ARGENTINA, 1931-1937 
 
Introduction 
Some time during the during the 1930’s, four Latin American ex- Presidents who 
had fallen into disgrace and were in exile gathered together to have lunch  in Buenos 
Aires. They included coronel David Toro, of Bolivia; Jose P. Guggiari, of Paraguay; 
doctor Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra, of Ecuador; and, Carlos Ibáñez from Chile.1 All of 
these men and their countries had suffered from the social, political, and economic effects 
of the Great Depression, a crisis that started with the collapse of the stock market in 
October 1929 in the United States. 2 
Between 1929 and 1932, Latin America would lose 65% of its trade. One result of 
this economic chaos was the multiplication of insurgencies and military coups throughout 
the continent. Capitalism’s days seemed to be numbered as populist and leftist parties 
raised pledges of radical solutions for corrupted systems. Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, would 
experience regime change through violence from 1930 to 1931. Venezuela’s Congress in 
June 1931, once again called upon Juan Vicente Gómez to govern after the interim of Juan 
Bautista Pérez. Uruguay had its own upheavals shortly after, in 1933. Mexico’s long 
                                                 
1 Ernesto Würth Rojas, Ibáñez, Caudillo Enigmático (Santiago: Editorial del Pacífico, 1958). 201. Also, 
Gonzalo Vial Correa, Historia De Chile (1891 - 1973), vol. V, De la república socialista al Frente Popular: 
(1931 - 1938) (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Santillana del Pacífico, 2001). 20 
2 Michael LaRosa and Germán Mejía P, An Atlas and Survey of Latin American History (Armonk, N.Y.: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2007). 100 
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revolutionary process, begun in 1910, would only produce a stable government in the 
second half of the 1930s. Nicaragua was “saved” by the United States’ occupation from 
1927 until 1933, an intrusive force that led to the anti imperialist campaign of Augusto C. 
Sandino. Only in Costa Rica and Colombia did social transformations occur through 
peaceful electoral means, though both countries experienced some measure of social 
unrest. This volatile climate of Latin America, would give rise to leaders like Getúlio 
Vargas, Juan Domingo Perón, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, and Jorge Ubico Castañeda. 
In Chile, the weight of accumulated foreign debt and the growing political 
opposition would also lead to political unrest. When Ibáñez had assumed power in 1927, 
he had governed with the support of the traditional political parties and the armed forces. 
Nevertheless, in January 1931 he had assumed special powers to avoid becoming a victim 
of the international economic crisis brought by the collapse of the Chilean economy.3 
Seven months later, a civil movement led by professionals and student organizations 
engaged in strikes demanding the resignation of the authorities. Ibáñez refused to send 
the army into the streets and believed it was better to step down from office.4 
Even today General Carlos Ibáñez remains one of the most controversial 
presidents in twentieth-century Chilean politics. Elected for his first administration in 
1927 with more than 90% of the votes, four years later he left power discredited. 
Historians have argued that there are two main arguments for his dramatic rise and fall: 
                                                 
3 Brian Loveman and Elizabeth Lira, eds., Los Actos De La Dictadura Comisión Investigadora, 1931 
(Santiago: Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana / Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y 
Museos,2006). 7 
4 Tobías Barros Ortiz, Recuerdos Oportunos (Santiago: Lathrop, 1938 ). 
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first, the effects of the world economic crisis as Chile’s foreign sales dropped by more 
than 90%;5 and second, the political oppression used by his government. During Ibañez’s 
exile from 1931 until his return to the country in 1937, Arturo Alessandri’s 
administration (1932-1938) accused Ibáñez of playing a destabilizing role in the 
constitutional order by taking part in every civil and military putsch to overthrow the 
government. Despite these charges, and just a couple of months after the government 
authorities lifted the restrictions barring his entrance to the country, part of Ibáñez’s 
supporters proclaimed him a candidate for the presidential elections of 1938. 
This paper will shed light on Ibáñez’s life from the moment he left for exile until 
his return in 1937. With the notable exceptions of Donoso, 6 Drake,7 Vial, 8 and 
Fermandois, 9 scholars have focused little attention on the period and Ibáñez himself. 
This research reconstructs Ibáñez’s tortuous life during this period using mainly his 
personal archive and memoirs of politicians of the time. The personal correspondence 
found in the former allows us for the first time to retrace Ibáñez’s steps during these 
years, providing an unexpected understanding of Ibáñez himself and this period of 
Chilean history. Although a number of memoirs appear in print, many remain 
underutilized because they are difficult to access. Aquiles Vergaras’ memoirs are the best 
                                                 
5 Simon Collier and William F. Sater, A History of Chile, 1808-2002, 2nd. ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 221 
6 Ricardo Donoso Novoa, Alessandri, Agitador Y Demoledor. Cincuenta Años De Historia Política De 
Chile, 2 vols. (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1953-1954). 
7 Paul W. Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile: 1932-52 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 
1978). 
8 Vial Correa, Historia De Chile (1891 - 1973). 
9 Joaquín Fermandois H., Abismo Y Cimiento: Gustavo Ross Y Las Relaciones Entre Chile Y Estados 
Unidos, 1932-1938 (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1997). 
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example. Published in Bolivia almost three decades after the events, the academy has 
paid little attention to them. What emerged from both Ibáñez’s personal letters and those 
of others is that, even though he had fallen into apparent disgrace and even in spite of 
himself, Ibáñez continued to be a destabilizing force to the political system. 
The Ibáñez’s family archive constitutes an invaluable source for the period and 
Chilean history in general. It includes documents from his presidential campaigns of 
1938 and 1942, his period as a senator (1949), and his second administration from 1952 
until 1958. While it is possible to consult these sources, access to his archive remains 
restricted. His papers still leave many questions unanswered. However, the current paper 
explores Ibáñez’s life and seeks more to understand this crucial period of Chilean history. 
The first part deals with the problems that Ibáñez had to face after he left power, the 
failures of his political project, and the attacks on his former administration’s 
achievements, until the overthrow of Juan Esteban Montero’s government. The second 
part deals with the political turmoil of 1932, how Ibáñez tried to accommodate to the 
political circumstances of the socialist republic, and how he tried to reposition himself in 
the political arena. A third section shows how Ibáñez resigned himself to the triumph of 
his fiercest political opponent, Arturo Alessandri, who won the 1932 presidential 
elections. He had to accept that he would be unable to return in the near future to Chile 
and he would have to rebuild a life in Buenos Aires. When after six complicated years 
Ibáñez returned to the country by mid-1937, he was more politically mature, and 
certainly more experienced. 
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Ibáñez’s political career was far from over. As mentioned before, he would 
become the presidential candidate of the neo-fascist movement for the elections of 1938 
(at the final moment he withdrew his candidacy, giving his support to the Popular 
Front).10 In 1942, a rightwing coalition supported him as its candidate, obtaining more 
than 43% of the electorate. Finally, in 1952 a multi-front right and left wing political 
movement took him once again to the presidency with more than 46% of the votes. 
Although his second presidency would not have the reformist impetus of his first 
administration, neither would it have the dictatorial character that had originally 
sentenced him to deportation.11 
Analysis of Ibáñez´s exile suggests a new way of understanding Latin American 
politics. His absence from Chile played a fundamental role. Either out of fear or out of 
respect, the different political factions played with his “absence,” making him a somehow 
invisible actor. Throughout, he worried about keeping up to date and staying in constant 
contact with many of the main actors and events of the Chilean politics. For his 
opponents and supporters, he was and still is a liminal figure for conceptualizing Chilean 
politics of the 1930’s. 
                                                 
10 Marcus Klein, La Matanza Del Seguro Obrero (5 De Septiembre De 1938) (Santiago: Globo Editores, 
2008). Regarding the Chilean Nazi movement, see Víctor Farías, Los Nazis En Chile, 2 vols. (Barcelona: 
Editorial Seix Barral, 2000-2003). 
11 Ricardo Cruz-Coke, Historia Electoral De Chile, 1925-1973 (Santiago: Editorial Jurídica, 1984). 
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1. Under an unwanted and tainted inheritance: Montero’s Administration 
On July 26, 1931 General Ibáñez left for Argentina, relinquishing office “…at the 
repeated urgings of Vice-President [Pedro] Opaso,12 you [Juan Esteban Montero13], 
General Sáez14 and several others” because they thought that it was the best way to calm 
the element of public opinion adverse to him.15 Ibáñez’s personal secretary René 
Montero recalls that Pedro Opaso, President of the Senate until the 26 of July and newly 
appointed Vice-President, acting in good faith assured Ibáñez that a constitutional permit 
had been rushed and approved in Congress so he could leave the country.16 To further 
encourage him, Juan Esteban Montero told Ibáñez before he departed, “History will 
remember the sacrifice you are making for the country.”17  
                                                 
12 Pedro Opaso Letelier, born in Talca in 1876 and died in 1957. Cabinet minister several times during 
Alessandri’s first administration. Later elected Deputy and Senator for several periods. As President of the 
Senate, he assumed the Vice-Presidency of the Republic due to the events of July 26, 1931. Due to the 
brevity of his participation as he resigned in favor of his Minster of Interior Juan Esteban Montero, the 
satiric press called him “One day flower.” The decrees 2,571 and 2,572 which delegated power on to the 
President of the Senate, were based on article 66 of the constitution of 1925. Armando de Ramón F., 
Biografías De Chilenos 1876-1973. Miembros De Los Poderes Ejecutivo, Legislativo Y Judicial, 4 vols. 
(Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica, 1999-2003). III, 199. Luis Valencia Avaria, Anales De La 
República, 1 ed., vol. I (Santiago: Imprenta Universidad, 1951). 422, n. 123-124. 
13 Juan Esteban Montero, born in Santiago in 1879 and died in the same city in 1948. He received his law 
degree from the Universidad de Chile. Ibáñez, despite that he was not his sympathetic, called him to the 
Ministry of Interior and of Social Welfare on the first days of July of 1931 in order to put an end the crisis. 
After July 26, Opaso Letelier delegated on him the Vice-Presidency of the Republic. On December of the 
same year, he assumed the Presidency of the Republic after winning the national election as the consensus 
candidate supported by a multiparty political front. Ramón F., Biografías De Chilenos 1876-1973. 
Miembros De Los Poderes Ejecutivo, Legislativo Y Judicial. III, 147.  
14 Carlos Saez Morales, born in Santiago in 1881 and died in the same city in 1941. He entered the Escuela 
Militar in 1895 and reached the rank of general. Minister of War during Montero´s presidency, he also was 
Minister of War and navy during Alessandri’s second administration. He published his 3 volume memoirs 
Recuerdos de un soldado which are rich sources for studying the period. Ibid. IV, 91-92. 
15 Letter from Tobías Barros to Juan Esteban Montero. Talca, November 9, 1931. 
16 René Montero Moreno, La Verdad Sobre Ibáñez (Buenos Aires: Editorial Freeland, 1953). 173 
17 Luis Correa Prieto, El Presidente Ibáñez, La Política Y Los Políticos. Apuntes Para La Historia 
(Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1962). 154 
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Years later in an interview with José Miguel Varas Calvo, Barros Ortíz18 affirmed 
that Ibáñez left the presidency because he feared that a bold minority opposition 
“reinforced by economical circumstances,” would continue inflaming and deluding 
students and leading Chile to a civil war.19 Following constitutional guidelines, Ibáñez 
requested permission from Parliament to step down, and the Senate approved it on the 
same day. The permit was temporarily tied up in the House of Deputies, however. Since 
his cabinet had already renounced their positions, Ibáñez’s rushed his departure, leaving 
the presidency in the hands of his temporary successor Pedro Opaso Letelier, chair of the 
Senate.20 The hurry was not only political. He had to reach the passageway through the 
Cordillera given that it might close any minute due to the heavy snow that often falls in 
July, sometimes closing the pass until September.21 
In the following days, with Ibáñez on his way to Buenos Aires, Congress deposed 
him for abandoning the country without the Parliament’s permission (July 29) citing 
article 67 of the Constitution.22 Pedro Opaso had given him a half-truth that his leaving 
was constitutional and Ibáñez felt betrayed. When he learned what happened, the now 
former President insisted on returning to the country, but his wife and Tobias Barros, who 
                                                 
18 Tobías Barros Ortíz, born in Santiago in 1894 and died in 1995. He enter the Escuela Militar  in 1895 
and retired from the army in 1940. Appointed secretary of the Junta of 1925. During the presidency of 
Pedro Aguirre Cerda appointed ambassador in Germany. In Ibáñez´s second administration, first appointed 
ambassador in Italy, and latter, Minister of Foreign Affairs, of the National Defense, and Public Education. 
Ramón F., Biografías De Chilenos 1876-1973. Miembros De Los Poderes Ejecutivo, Legislativo Y 
Judicial.I, 160 
19 José Miguel Varas Calvo, Ibáñez, El Hombre. (Biografía, Historia, Crítica) (Santiago de Chile: Talleres 
Gráficos "El Imparcial", 1952)., 202 
20 Letter of Tobías Barros to Juan Esteban Montero. Talca, November 9, 1931 
21 Tobías Barros Ortiz, Tobías Barros Ortiz: Entrevista, ed. Claudio Orrego Vicuña (Santiago: Aconcagua, 
1979). 76 
22 Vial Correa, Historia De Chile (1891 - 1973). 15-16 
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were accompanying him, convinced him otherwise.23 Subsequently after his deposition, 
the chamber of Deputies presented an impeachment of the former President to the Senate. 
They accused him of prosecuting members of Parliament and other citizens (arrests, 
deportations, exiles) during the term of his administration.24 
As soon as Carlos Ibáñez reached Buenos Aires, he gave a first interview to a 
reporter. He declared that he was serene and in complete peace in all that concerned his 
actions. He affirmed that he had not escaped and his departure was by no means a 
runaway, however, for the moment, he preferred to remain silent as to the events. He 
declared himself a “spectator” and that he would remain in the city willing to comply 
with the Chilean law if called upon to return to his country. Lastly, he affirmed that he 
would stay in Buenos Aires for an underdetermined period.25 
Ibáñez never gave up the idea of going back to Chile to defend himself. Carlos 
Sáez, Minister of War under the Vice-Presidency of Montero, recalls in his memoirs the 
commotion produced by the rumors that the General intended to return. Sáez says that the 
rumors were true, as he had received a telegram from Ibáñez that confirmed his plans. He 
wanted to challenge that mistaken idea that he had fled and he wanted to know why the 
government had not confirmed that. He also wanted to return with the authorization of 
the Montero government to respond to any charges that the opposition might bring 
against him at the Senate’s impeachment procedure. Montero´s government was 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 16. Also, Tobías Barros Ortiz, Recogiendo Los Pasos -Testigo Militar Y Político Del Siglo Xx 
(Santiago: Editorial Planeta, 1988). 
24 Vial Correa, Historia De Chile (1891 - 1973). 16 
25 Würth Rojas, Ibáñez, Caudillo Enigmático. 181 
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especially concerned and Montero personally committed himself to resolve the situation 
of the former President.26 At any rate, the Ibáñez informed the consul in Buenos Aires of 
his intentions of flying to Santiago and asked his friends to spare no effort in allowing 
him to defend himself.27 
 With Montero’s permission, Sáez called Ibáñez and informed him about the 
terrible consequences that his arrival might produce not only for the new government, but 
also for the country, as it might even lead to a civil war due to the precarious political 
situation. Faced with these facts, the General decided not to return.28 This may explain 
why several days later the Government reported that it had communicated to Ibáñez that 
the Senate decided to proceed with the impeachment, and that Ibáñez declared that he had 
nothing to answer.29 Seeing that it was impossible to return, Ibáñez sent a letter to the 
Chamber of Deputies30 and published the pamphlet “Ex-President Ibáñez confronts the 
                                                 
26 Letter from Tobías Barros to Juan Esteban Montero. Talca, November 9, 1931. 
27 Montero Moreno, La Verdad Sobre Ibáñez. 177 
28 Carlos Sáez Morales, Recuerdos De Un Soldado, 3 vols. (Santiago: Editorial Ercilla, 1933-1934). III, 24-
26 
29 Würth Rojas, Ibáñez, Caudillo Enigmático. 183 
30 Cámara de Diputados, 49ª sesión ordinaria, 31 de agosto de 1931, p. 1765-1767. In, Brian Loveman and 
Elizabeth Lira, Las Acusaciones Constitucionales En Chile. Una Perspectiva Histórica (Santiago: LOM 
Ediciones / FLACSO Chile, 2000). 31. Extracts of the letter with date August 27, 1931are as follows: 
 
 “Cuando el desgobierno, la anarquía y la corrupción habían conducido al estagnamiento nacional, 
cuando el pueblo, engañado y abandonado, era la victima constante de los políticos y agitadores 
profesionales, cuando los responsables del destine de la patria, desoyendo el clamor general del país que 
pedía progreso, trabajo y bienestar parecían únicamente empeñados en exhibir su aparente respeto por la 
Constitución, invocada como baluarte para justificar la inacción y cada vez que se trataba de defender 
intereses en pugna con el bien público, la juventud de las fuerzas armadas, seguida por la opinión sana del 
país, puso  término a un periodo de la historia nacional que no necesito calificar (...) 
Si hice bien o mal, eso lo dirá la historia, cuyo fallo no lograran torcer ni la campaña de odios y de 
falsedades que con propósitos explicable se quiere desprestigiar el régimen que yo serví, ni la acusación 
constitucional que formulan en mi contra, en términos que no se me han dado a conocer, algunos 




accusation” in Buenos Aires.31 
The debate and vote for the impeachment occurred on October 26. Vial says that 
it was grotesque that the same people that held office thanks to Ibáñez in the “Congreso 
Termal,”32 now wanted to prosecute him. Vial added that senator Juan Luis Carmona 
demanded to know why these charges were not brought before Congress during the 
“dictatorship,” and he also claims that Enrique Zañartu and Fidel Estay made a solid 
defense of Ibáñez. Pedro Pablo Dartnell, an old friend and former comrade of Ibáñez, 
recognized the patriotism and honesty of the defendant's intentions, but he also 
maintained that Ibáñez had violated the Constitution. The Senate finally approved the 
charges with Estay offering the sole dissenting vote, since Zañartu did not attend.33 
Ibáñez had abandoned power with the “traditional poorness” with which Chilean 
                                                                                                                                                 
(...) No es mi deseo recurrir en mi defensa a argumentos abogadiles, pero si debo manifestar que 
después de esos hechos fui elegido Presidente de la Republica, cuya elección fue sancionada por la gran 
mayoría del Congreso Nacional, elegido por el pueblo dos años antes y fui adamado de un extremo a otro 
del país; a todas las provincias que visite, cansadas de anarquía política y desgobierno, se me pedía 
gobierno fuerte, el restablecimiento de la autoridad y la expulsión de los elementos perturbadores. Si hice 
mal accediendo a los impulsos de una fuerte opinión pública, resuelva ahora la Honorable Cámara si debo 
expiar en el presidio el delito de haber llevado a la realidad las aspiraciones nacionales de ese tiempo. Una 
vez más, el 26 de julio último, quise satisfacer nuevamente las aspiraciones del país, quise cumplir los 
deseos exteriorizados por una gran cantidad de mis conciudadanos que clamaban por un gobierno 
totalmente civil. Dentro de mi invariable propósito de someterme a la voluntad nacional y de evitar 
derramamiento de sangre, resolví delegar el mando a un civil. Lo hice en el Presidente del Senado.” 
 
31 Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, El Ex–Presidente Ibáñez Contesta La Acusación (Buenos Aires: S/P, 1931). 
32 In the “Congreso Termal,” the representatives of both chambers were not elected since the political 
parties and the administration of the time, reached an agreement to bypass the elections. The legality of this 
accord was based on the law of general elections that stated that if a district or circumscription had the 
same amount of candidates as electable members, elections would not be enforced. It is not hard to imagine 
that the Government must have used this to exclude any dissident voice. On the other hand, the political 
parties won the favor of an administration that at that time seemed so popular. Once the popularity of the 
administration started to decay, its acceptance turned intolerable. The name was given due to Chillan 
thermae, placed where the meetings were held in order to select the candidates. 
33 Vial Correa, Historia De Chile (1891 - 1973). 16 
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presidents leave power.34 He left the country with only the five thousand pesos that 
corresponded to his current wages.35 When, at the beginning of 1932, two young 
Chileans paid him a visit (one of which was the son of a prominent political figure), one 
of his first impressions was of the modesty of Ibanez’s circumstances. He says his case 
was “curious” for someone accused of being a dictator. He believed that his image was 
far from fitting the typical description of Latin American dictators: “egomaniacal and 
greedy, determined to enrich themselves with the income of the public treasury, looking 
forward to owning all kinds of business.” On the contrary, this eyewitness points out that 
“the Ibáñez I have met is on the contrary, someone who does not use the ‘I’ for 
everything he says, and lives in two narrow rooms.”36 To further prove his point he says 
that when he took a taxi and asked the driver to take him to Ibáñez, he was surprised of 
the taxi driver response: “Ibáñez is a serious person and that lives in a small apartment… 
how different to Guggiari [former President of Paraguay] who lives in juergas [parties] 
and in a palace!”37 
Once Ibáñez had settled in Buenos Aires, he received letters from many fellow 
countrymen that not only provided insight into their emotional response to his leaving but 
also considered those variables that produced his defeat. One letter noted, “The grief and 
pain caused by your estrangement, which we deem temporary, is so great that I cannot 
                                                 
34 Ricardo Boizard, Cuatro Retratos En Profundidad: Ibáñez - Lafertte - Leighton - Walker (Santiago: 
Talleres de "El Imparcial", 1950). 63 
35 Vial Correa, Historia De Chile (1891 - 1973). 19 
36 Correa Prieto, El Presidente Ibáñez, La Política Y Los Políticos. Apuntes Para La Historia. 21 
37 Ibid. 18 
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tell… all that I am suffering, all this enormous anguish because of your departure.”38 
Another letter suggested that Chile would fall on apocalyptical times: “…all hope of 
tomorrow has ended, the future is no longer of import, my interest in the future has 
abated…”39. One of Ibáñez’s correspondents even sent him letters that came close to 
being true declarations of love: “If I would have loved you… you were single, and as 
President… you needed to be loved.”40 
Correspondents pondered over what had led to the failure of the Ibáñez’s project 
to renew the political system and modernize the country. One noted that even though 
Ibáñez might have had good intentions, he undoubtedly lacked good collaborators: 
“perhaps the obstacles were so great that you could not avoid them, and bit by bit things 
got to an extreme that created a mire that in itself led to the events which we all today 
regret.”41 As a modern author asserts, “in spite of persecutions and censorship [during 
Ibáñez’s administration], a temporary aura of prosperity made many people optimistic.” 
However, when the depression struck, “the Ibáñez formula for prosperity failed.”42 
It is notable that while some of the letters sent to Ibáñez expressed support, others 
attempted to justify the less than accommodating attitudes of some of his former 
collaborators after he left office. For example, Ismael Edwards Matte explained his 
                                                 
38 Letter of Colonel Ernesto García Fernández to Carlos Ibáñez. July 31, 1931 
39 Letter of Colonel Ernesto García Fernández to Carlos Ibáñez. July 31, 1931 
40 Letter of Elena Sanhueza Saavedra to Carlos Ibáñez. July 31, 1931 
41 Letter of Santiago Castro López to Carlos Ibáñez. August 1, 1931 
42 John L. Rector, The History of Chile (Westport, Cunnecticut / London: Greenwood Press, 2003). 149 
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“abstention and silence” in defense of the fallen regime with a boxing analogy.43 He 
suggested that “In many cases it is convenient ‘not to fight’ in the early rounds.”44 He 
justified himself by saying that he now knew that he was right when he had proposed 
years earlier the importance of creating a political movement that could have helped 
channel the ideals of Ibáñism. The organized group would have displaced the antiquated 
political party structure of the old times guided by the “ideology of the revolution” that 
Ibáñez embodied, and would have prevented the resurgence of the same old structure that 
tore him down.45 
As will become evident later, neither Ibáñez nor the majority of his supporters 
anticipated the usefulness of a political “front” that embodied Ibáñez’s principles for the 
time of crisis they were living. Ismael Edwards may have been right when he said that 
this “front” could have prevented (or at least delayed) the political calamity of the 
country. With its help, the government could have relied on a well-organized political 
organization that confronted the criticism of the opposition, but Ibáñez had delayed the 
emergence of a personalistic political movement. However, as René Olivares mentions, 
such a transformation of Chilean politics in 1931 was already underway, as the 
“Alessandrismo”46 phenomenon had already erupted.47 
                                                 
43 Ismael Edwards Matte, born in Santiago in 1891. Received his bachelor’s degree in architecture from the 
Universidad de Chile. Writer, he was also member of the House of Representatives in the years 1921-1924, 
1926-1930, and 1930-1932 as member of the Liberal Party. Ramón F., Biografías De Chilenos 1876-1973. 
Miembros De Los Poderes Ejecutivo, Legislativo Y Judicial. II, 45-46 
44 Letter of Ismael Edwards Matte to Carlos Ibáñez. October 18, 1931 
45 Letter of Ismael Edwards Matte to Carlos Ibáñez. October 18, 1931 
46 Followers of former president Arturo Alessandri Palma. Linares, 1868 - Santiago, 1950. Member of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate for several periods. Twice President of the Republic, 1920-1925 
and 1932-1938. During his first administration, where he was elected with a populist discourse and the 
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Indeed, when at the beginning of July of 1931 the crisis had become inevitable, 
this “alessandrismo” was one of the expressions of the anti-Ibáñez movement. 
Government supporters regretted the return of those exiled by Ibáñez’s regime, especially 
former president Arturo Alessandri Palma, as he capitalized on the prevailing 
discontent.48 According to those close to Ibáñez, the mass arrival of the people he had 
exiled would cause the resurrection of the old and infected political scheming against 
which he had struggled. Nevertheless, the pro-Ibañistas hoped that the returning 
politicians with their “retinue of ambitions and sterile struggles,” and their “strikes and 
threats,” would open the eyes of the Chilean populace so they might appreciate the order 
and respect for the authority of the Ibáñez administration.49 
When the government fell, a tenacious persecution began of Ibáñez and his 
collaborators, specially the closest ones. Tobías Barros Ortíz first informed Ibáñez that 
retributions had not occurred and that he had spoken to Carlos Dávila,50 Ismael Edwards, 
                                                                                                                                                 
support of the most progressive parties, his presidency was considered the first one that truly represented 
the lower classes. He had to deal with the civil and military upheavals that led him to a short term exile, 
exile that did not last much as young officials led by Ibáñez imposed his return to finish his presidential 
term. As we show later, he was elected President in 1932. He would finish his second term with the support 
of the traditional parties, postponing the progressive ones to the opposition. Chile´s political life during 
most part of the twentieth century was determine by the figures of Alessandri, and Carlos Ibáñez del 
Campo. 
47 René Olivares, Alessandri, precursor y revolucionario, published privately, Santiago, 1942, 128-129, In, 
Robert J. Alexander, Arturo Alessandri: A Biography, 2 vols. (Ann Arbor: Published for Latin American 
Institute, Rutgers University, by University Microfilms International, 1977). II, 531 
48 Letter of “Estrella del Oriente” to Carlos Ibáñez. August 4, 1931 
49 Letter of Alfredo Riveros Figueroa to Carlos Ibáñez. August 5, 1931 
50 Carlos Dávila, born in Los Ángeles (Chile) in 1887 and died in Washington (USA) in 1955. He received 
his PhD degree in Law at Columbia University. Editor of the newspaper La Nación 1917-1927 and 1933-
1954. Appointed ambassador to the United States during Ibáñez first administration, became Provisional 
President of the Republic when the “socialist republic” was proclaimed in 1932. In 1954, appointed 
secretary General of the Organization of American States, post he held until his death nearly a year after. 
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and numerous officers and friends, to confirm that they had arranged no counterattack. 
Barros considered that the opposition “has been let loose,”51 Frödden 52 was in the 
northern city of La Serena, Torreblanca53 at his home, and Fenner54 in his hiding place, 
though he had yet not appeared publicly. From General Blanche, Barros did not have any 
news.55 
Indeed, just nine days after Ibáñez left the country, the Vice-President of the 
Republic Juan Esteban Montero –in part due to the pressure from different political 
sectors, but mainly from the newly arrived exiles from the regime– signed a decree. It 
created a commission to conduct a comprehensive study of Ibáñez’s administration since 
1927.56 The commission sought “the truth,” and wanted to document the role of the 
dictatorship in both violations of individual rights as well as the financial 
mismanagement of the country.57 
The “Comisión investigadora de los actos de la dictadura” only served to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Ramón F., Biografías De Chilenos 1876-1973. Miembros De Los Poderes Ejecutivo, Legislativo Y Judicial. 
II, 11 
51 Bartolomé Blanche Espejo (La Serena, 1879 – Santiago, 1970). Joined the Army on 1895 and reached 
the rank of Commander in Chief. Minister during Ibáñez first administration, on September 1932 he 
assumed the Provisional Presidency when the socialist republic was torn down. Ibid. I, 183 
52 Carlos Frödden Lorenzen (Coronel, 1887 – Santiago, 1976). Joined the Chilean Navy reaching the rank 
of Vessel Capitan on 1929. On Ibáñez first Administration,appointed Minister of Marine, and later, of 
Interior. Ibid. II, 112 
53 Edecio Torreblanca White (Valparaíso, 1888 – Santiago, 1958). Comptroller General of the Republic 
during Ibáñez’s first Administration.  After he retired, appointed Minister, both on the first and second of 
Ibáñez´s administrations. Ibid. IV, 184-185 
54 Oscar Fenner Marín (Curicó, 1892 – Santiago, 1982). Entered the Escuela Militar  in 1906. In 1922, he 
received his bachelor´s degree in Law. During Ibáñez’s first administration, appointed Secretary General of 
the Presidency, and afterwards, Ministry of Land and Colonization. During Ibáñez’s second administration, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice-Minister of Education. Ibid. II, 83. 
55 Letter of Tobías Barros to Carlos Ibáñez. August 6, 1931 
56 Loveman and Lira, eds., Los Actos De La Dictadura Comisión Investigadora, 1931. 9 
57 Ibid. 13 
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exacerbate the existing hatreds. All achievements of Ibáñez’s administration were subject 
to revision and, as one of the letters to the exiled leader recalled, “Many have vainly tried 
to erase any memory of your time in the House of Government.” The same document 
highlighted that some had thought, “Simplistically… that by eliminating the inscriptions 
on buildings, bridges and roads that were evidence of the material progress” that they 
could definitively get rid of Ibáñez as a major historical figure.58 
Ibáñez’s enemies did not stop at demeaning his governmental accomplishments. 
His opponents pursued his collaborators and, logically, Ibáñez himself. Juan Pablo 
Bennett59 informed the General that some intended to deliver Ibáñez the coup de grâce 
by requesting “his removal from the Army under the pretext of the declaration of guilt 
made by the Senate,”60 which would deprive him of his pension. Bennett added that he 
had been in touch with General Vergara61 who had been working tirelessly to secure 
Ibáñez’s retirement with the support of Manuel Trucco.62 However, problems arose when 
Marcial Mora63 and other Ministers of the cabinet began a “tenacious and bitter 
                                                 
58 Letter of Ismael Edwards to Carlos Ibáñez. October 18, 1931 
59 General Juan Pablo Bennet Argandoña (La Serena, 1871 – Santiago, 1951) joined the Army on 1883 and 
retired on 1925. Member of the Military Junta of September 1924. Ramón F., Biografías De Chilenos 
1876-1973. Miembros De Los Poderes Ejecutivo, Legislativo Y Judicial. I, 173 
60 Letter of Juan Pablo Bennett to Carlos Ibáñez. November 5, 1931 
61 Carlos Vergara Montero (1883-1959) joined the army reaching the rank of General. On Montero’s 
government, appointed Minister of War. Ramón F., Biografías De Chilenos 1876-1973. Miembros De Los 
Poderes Ejecutivo, Legislativo Y Judicial. IV, 255 
62 Manuel Trucco Franzani (Cauquenes, 1875 – Santiago, 1954), professor of the Universidad de Chile 
when called to take part of the Montero administration as Minister of Interior. Became Vice-President 
during the presidential campaign of 1931, as Montero ran for office on for that year elections. Senator of 
the Radical Party. During Alessandri´s second administration, appointed ambassador to the USA. Ibid. IV, 
190 
63 Marcial Mora (Chillán, 1895 – Santiago, 1972), appointed Prime Minister during the Trucco Vice-
Presidency, and conserved his post when Montero won the elections. During Aguirre Cerda´s 
administration, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Finance. During Juan Antonio Rios´ presidency, appointed 
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campaign” against Ibáñez.64 The newspapers reported that the message that dismissed 
Ibáñez from the army had been “written and signed” by Trucco and Vergara. The 
involvement of the former did not surprise Bennett, since he was never a sympathizer, but 
he found Vergara’s actions hard to believe, since he considered him a good man and a 
friend of Ibáñez. As might be expected, Ibáñez reacted to this campaign against him with 
resentment. He wrote to his former personal secretary saying that in fairness, his pension 
belonged to him by law, adding that a rightful Government would never deny him “the 
bread to which I aspire… the only reward for the sacrifice of a lifetime devoted to the 
public service of Chile.”65 
The attempt to dismiss Ibáñez from the army led a group of pro-Ibañista officials 
to request early retirement en masse. The most notable case was that of Commander 
Barros Ortíz. However, the Government denied Ortiz’s request and postponed the Ibáñez 
dismissal.66 From Buenos Aires, Ibáñez wrote to Admiral von Schröeders67 saying that 
                                                                                                                                                 
ambassador in the USA. Member of the Radical Party, he also was Senator and member of the House of 
Representatives. Ibid. III, 156 
64 In a divergent version, Carlos Sáez Morales recalls in his memoirs that in the cabinet of ministers all 
members agreed in a first moment that it was not possible to deprive a former public employee form its 
pension. However, the problem was that they feared what the reaction would be of such decree and if 
would further exacerbate the public opinion. Sáez Morales, Recuerdos De Un Soldado. III, 27 
65 Letter from Carlos Ibáñez to René Montero, September de 1931. In, Montero Moreno, La Verdad Sobre 
Ibáñez. 177 
66 Letter of Juan Pablo Bennett to Carlos Ibáñez. November 5, 1931. Barros Ortíz recalls these events in an 
interview made by José Miguel Varas Calvo. He says that he had accompanied Ibáñez and his wife to exile 
and stayed with him during eight days. When the accusations arose that Ibáñez had fled, he tried to return 
but the government did not allow it. That is when Barros Ortíz presented his dismissal from the army. 
However, and in order to prevent major conflicts, the government assigned him a regiment, “which it 
seemed weird to do since I had been the aide-de-camp of the one who had fled and had helped him do so.” 
Varas Calvo, Ibáñez, El Hombre. (Biografía, Historia, Crítica). 201 
67 Edgardo von Schröeders Sarraeta (born in Valparaíso in1886), joined the Navy and reached the rank of 
Vice-Admiral. Minister of Navy on Ibáñez first administration 1930-1931. Apointed by Trucco’s 
administration as negotiator to end a low rank marine revolt on the Coquimbo bay on the first days of 
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he found it hard to bear the venomous persecution, and that “if it were not for the material 
consciences that the removal from the army would cause me, it would not matter to me at 
all that they do as they wish.” Morally, he felt “ quite superior to those people…”68 
According to Vial, the government attempted to mitigate the problem by finally calling 
for his retirement, a measure that not even Ibáñez himself could question and that saved 
him from losing his pension.69 
Ibáñez’s friends were also concerned with keeping him informed about his family 
in Chile. Tobías Barros wrote that he had been able to talk to his wife’s family, and was 
pleased to let him know that his youngest children were very well.70 Barros had gone to 
visit them with his wife, and the youngest one Rosita was admirably serene and tranquil, 
“a quality rare in a little girl.” Barros affirmed the best thing would be that Cayo and 
Rosita leave, because General Saez believed that Cayo, Ibáñez’s eldest son, would not be 
able to study since “the passions will continue uncontrolled until after the Presidential 
election. As to Rosita, no one will bother her, of that I am convinced …”71 
Tobías Barros Ortíz was also concerned with keeping Ibáñez abreast of ongoing 
politics. Elections in Chile were his special interest because of the uncertainty they 
                                                                                                                                                 
September 1931. Ramón F., Biografías De Chilenos 1876-1973. Miembros De Los Poderes Ejecutivo, 
Legislativo Y Judicial. IV, 120. Also, William F. Sater, "The Abortive Kronstadt: The Chilean Naval 
Mutiny of 1931," The Hispanic American Historical Review 60, no. 2 (1980); Frederick M. Nunn, Chilean 
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68 Letter from Carlos Ibáñez to Edgardo von Schroeders. Buenos Aires, November 14, 1931 
69 Vial Correa, Historia De Chile (1891 - 1973). 19 
70 Carlos Ibáñez del Campo first married Rosa Quiróz Ávila while serving a military mission in El 
Salvador, giving him two children. Widower, and during his first presidency, he married with Graciela 
Letelier Velasco with whom he had four more children. 
71 Letter of Tobías Barros to Carlos Ibáñez. August 6, 1931 
19 
 
entailed: “About the future President, I very much fear that if there is no reaction soon, 
the communists will triumph.” With an election two months away and with no time to 
renew or revise the electoral records, it could produce “the greatest of surprises for the 
famous historic parties.”72 He also believed that, although “El León” –as Alessandri was 
known–did not have much of a chance to win the election, he could be working for a 
“transitioning candidate” not yet determined. Moreover, he thought that Montero already 
seemed to be tired of power, but “there is no doubt that if they beg him, he will accept the 
Presidency.” Ladislao Errázuriz,73 the eternal candidate of the Liberal Party and 
representative of the old ruling class, seemed unlikely to be elected “unless there is an 
unexpected change.”74 
After learning of Montero’s triumph in the elections, Ibáñez wrote to his friend 
Arturo Prat Carvajal75 to solicit his opinion about ongoing events. He felt satisfied that 
the country had “gotten the President it wished…” He was sure that Montero could be 
successful; however, he concluded that everything depended on the help he received from 
friends and supporters, “because if they abandon him or if he rests on his laurels, instead 
of his Administration triumphing, Juan Esteban will be the next victim. And that is what 
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73 Ladislao Errázuriz Lazcano (Santiago, 1882 – Fundo El Peumo, 1941), Minister of War and Marine 
during Sanfuentes’ administration. Member of Congress for several periods, became one of the most 
important members of the Liberal Party being its presidential candidate on January of 1925. Ramón F., 
Biografías De Chilenos 1876-1973. Miembros De Los Poderes Ejecutivo, Legislativo Y Judicial. 60-61 
74 Letter of Tobías Barros to Carlos Ibáñez. August 6, 1931 
75 Arturo Prat Carvajal (Santiago, 1878 – Santiago, 1955), son the Chilean hero of the War of the Pacific 
Arturo Prat Chacón. Appointed Minister of Finance during the Sanfuente’s and Montero’s administrations’. 




must be avoided at all costs for the good of the country.”76 
TABLE 1: Result of the elections held October 4, 193177 
     
Candidates Number of votes Percentages 
Juan Esteban Montero 182,177 63,93% 
Arturo Alessandri 99,075 34,77% 
Manuel Hidalgo 1,263 0,44% 
Elías Lafertte 2,434 0,86% 
 
  
Since the elections led to a new constitutional government, the possibility of 
Ibáñez returning to the country depended on the new authorities. This is why Juan Pablo 
Bennett was concerned about exploring the possibility of ending Ibáñez’s exile in the 
near future. However, he wrote to Ibáñez that his return for the time being would cause 
alarm “until the course of the Montero Administration could be clearly seen, and no one 
is disguising the difficulties and stumbling blocks that he will face.” That is why he 
encouraged Ibáñez to prepare himself to remain abroad for at least one more year.78 
In the meantime, the pro-ibañistas decided to use the media to shield the ideals 
that Ibañism embodied. However, the existing press at the time was not willing to risk 
accusations of supporting the fallen government. The importance of defending securing 
themselves from the accusations against them led to the idea of publishing an “Ibañist” 
newspaper. Carlos Dávila was in charge of organizing it, and Valdés would be the editor. 
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77 Germán Urzúa Valenzuela, Historia Política De Chile Y Su Evolución Electoral (Desde 1819 a 1992) 
(Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 1992). 454 
78 Letter of Juan Pablo Bennett to Carlos Ibáñez. Santiago, October 13, 1931 
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The collaborators called the proposed newspaper La Prensa.79 An “official” publication 
would help them to organize, but it would also foreclose any attempt by political 
opponents to say that the “Ibañists” were conspiring.80 The pro-ibañistas wrote to 
General Ibáñez asking for his collaboration. More importantly, they asked if he could 
send Renato Valdés81 a copy of the notification from the Chilean Embassy in Argentina 
that informed him that he could not enter the country so that they could make it public.82 
However, this first attempt at founding a newspaper ultimately failed. Some time 
later, Ibañism was able to produce a publication that defended its ideals. Ismael Edwards, 
Antonio Planet83 and Conrado Ríos were involved in the magazine Hoy.84 Carlos Dávila, 
who had been the editor of what became the official newspaper of the fallen government 
(and owned by the state) La Nación, became the editor once again. Edwards’ economic 
support was key in opening and sustaining the magazine during the first period. 
Nevertheless, historian Ricardo Donoso doubts the “purity of the intentions” of this 
                                                 
79 Letter of Joaquín Fernández to Carlos Ibáñez. Santiago, November 20, 1931 
80 Letter of Emilio Rodríguez Mendoza to Carlos Ibáñez. December 14, 1931 
81 Renato Valdés Alfonso, closed supporter of Ibáñez whom in the first administration granted him with the 
Intendancy of Bío Bío, and afterwards the one of the city of Concepción. Later, Consul in Austria and 
Panamá. Editor of the Revista Estanquero that was closely linked to the Ibañismo and Ibáñez himself. 
Owner of the restaurant El Naturista, place well known for publishing in its walls news regarding Ibáñez 
and his followers. Ramón F., Biografías De Chilenos 1876-1973. Miembros De Los Poderes Ejecutivo, 
Legislativo Y Judicial. IV, 212 
82 Months later Emilio Rodriguez wrote to General Ibáñez to convince him that he needed to write his 
testimony and publish it. In fact, he offered him to help: “…how interesting, how useful, and how 
indispensable to history […] would be that you would write your memoirs from January 1925 till July 
1931[…] If you are resolved to work with me two or months… I would see how to move to undertake the 
task as soon as possible.” Later we will see how effectively Ibáñez left a diary but of his exile. Letter of 
Emilio Rodríguez Mendoza to Carlos Ibáñez. April 3, 1932 
83 Antonio Planet Cordero, editor of the newspaper La Nación. In charged of the negotiations on the 
question of the Tacna and Arica. Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, and Minister of Justice during 
Ibañez’s first administration. José Armando de Ramón Folch, Biografías De Chilenos 1876-1973. 
Miembros De Los Poderes Ejecutivo, Legislativo Y Judicial, 4 vols. (Santiago: Ediciones Universidad 
Católica, 1999-2003). III, 257-258. 
84 The political magazine Hoy was published from November 1931 until October 1943 
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publication. He says that Hoy and its pro-Alessandri counterpart Crónica magazine, from 
their first edition waged a “ruthless campaign of criticism, a bloody and corrosive 
hostility… a systematic discrediting of Montero’s administration.”85 
One year later, in December 1932, the magazine already had a capital of around 
200,000 pesos and a large readership. Davila, who had borrowed ideas from the newly 
founded US magazine Time, was largely responsible for the success of Hoy.86 The plan 
was for the magazine to evolve into a newspaper, but to do so required a significant 
amount of capital. The Ibañists therefore intended to invite Guzmán Moreno87 to 
participate in the company, as he possessed the necessary means. Before they made an 
agreement, they asked Ibáñez to make an initial approach since Guzmán Moreno had 
been one of his supporters. Unfortunately, on January 9th 1933, Guzmán Moreno died 
suddenly and the newspaper project was postponed.88 Instead, the organizers of Hoy 
eventually published the satirical magazine Verdejo, which helped to counter the satirical 
attacks against the General. According to Conrado Ríos, unlike Topaze “it is funny and 
… it stands out for its good and clean jokes.”89  
The whereabouts of General Ibáñez at the beginning of 1932 was cause for 
speculation in the Chilean press. Only his closest collaborators were aware that he had set 
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87 Fernando Guzmán Moreno (1872-1933) Member of Parliament during the years 1918-1921. Ramón 
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89 Letter from Conrado Ríos to Carlos Ibáñez, February 3, 1933 
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up residence in Mendoza, just on the other side of the cordillera. Olegario Lazo Baeza’s90 
letter to Ibáñez in May 1932 shows the confusion surrounding Ibáñez’s whereabouts, as 
he informed him that telegrams published in the French newspapers placed him in the 
city of La Plata. Others speculated that he was on a trip to El Salvador, where he had met 
his first wife while on a military mission in the first decade of the twentieth century, and 
where he still had important contacts. The most recent speculation of the press according 
to Lazo Baeza, placed him in Mendoza awaiting authorization from the Chilean 
government to return to the country.91 
Letters to Ibáñez also speculated that Montero’s administration was considering 
the possibility of allowing the General to return to the country. Since the situation 
remained unchanged and Ibáñez was not convinced that this could be true, he wrote to 
Liberal Party Senator Gabriel Letelier Elgart92 and asked him to help his wife Graciela to 
arrange her trip to Argentina. Ibáñez was especially fearful that the children would 
“freeze” while crossing the mountains “unless they leave in perfectly good condition.” 
He insisted he should contact the manager of PANGRA –the Pan-American Grace 
Airways–, to request the greatest facilities possible for the trip and even a 50% discount 
on the fare.93 
There was another reason why Ibáñez hurried to bring his family to the other side 
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books regarding the military life. Fernando  Castillo (et.al.), Diccionario Histórico Y Biográfico De Chile 
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91 Letter of Olegario Lazo to Carlos Ibáñez, May 8, 1932. 
92 Gabriel Letelier Elgart (b.1886), member of the Liberal Party. Elected member of the House of 
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of the cordillera: Ricardo Letelier94  –his father-in-law and political patron–95 had died on 
March 14 of that year. Emilio Rodríguez Mendoza96 had written to Ibáñez informing him 
that, due to Leteliers’s relation with the General, “there were no speeches at the burial, 
which means that politics even reached funerals.”97 
The year 1932 would be tremendously difficult for Chile. Reports sent to Ibáñez 
showed that the situation in the country seemed to worsen every day. One of the letters 
highlighted that people talked incessantly of “conspiracies, juntas, and caudillos.” 
Rodríguez Mendoza could not assert if there was any truth to any of these rumors. What 
he could confirm was that the danger of a popular uprising was growing, but 
unfortunately, it was “no longer political in nature but rather terrifyingly and exclusively 
social.”98 Emilio Rodríguez also informed Ibáñez that the situation had reached a point 
where “…today, one must be ready to go to war against hunger because there is a 
Bolshevik in every empty stomach…” What aggravated the situation, according to 
Rodríguez, was the fact that the Government believed that there was a permanent 
conspiracy against it, since it perceived there was unanimous discontent. True or not, the 
only ones exempted from charges of conspiracy were “the small circle that had avidly 
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De Los Poderes Ejecutivo, Legislativo Y Judicial. IV, 58. 
97 Letter from Emilio Rodríguez to Carlos Ibáñez, April 3, 1932 
98 Letter from Emilio Rodríguez to Carlos Ibáñez, April 3, 1932 
25 
 
regained power again after 4 years of forced estrangement” and were already inside 
Montero’s administration.99 
Ibáñez worried about the situation of the country as he received news from 
different sources. He considered that the scenario could not be more serious, mainly 
because of the disorientation of the government. If major changes did not occur, he 
thought, tyranny would become the only solution. His perception was that a final debacle 
was inevitable, as Chile was on its way to resembling the Mexico of Madero and Pancho 
Villa. He expressed concern about how the situation might affect the country’s foreign 
policy, and he worried that Chile would be humiliated before the rest of the world: “all 
because of our domestic anarchy and pessimism and virtually total disarmament…”100 
However, his desire was not to intervene, for the moment, in politics. His only and most 
heartfelt aspiration was to strengthen his family life by reuniting it once again.101 
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2. The political turmoil of 1932: Ibáñez and the socialist republic 
Ibáñez’s perception of Chilean reality turned out to be quite accurate. On June 4 
of 1932, a coalition of army officers, freemasons, and socialists, staged a successful coup 
that overthrew Montero’s administration. However, Ibáñez did not take a critical position 
because some of his supporters were involved. Led by Marmaduke Grove and Eugenio 
Matte Hurtado, they proclaimed the “socialist republic.”  
As soon as Ibáñez received the news of June 4th, he sent telegrams to Alejandro 
Lazo102 at the Ministry of the Interior, and Marmaduke Grove103 at the Ministry of 
Defense.104 He also sent one to Carlos Dávila, who had been involved in the events from 
the first moment. A letter congratulating him followed, wherein Ibáñez lauded the fall of 
the “infamous Government of Mr. Montero,” adding that under firmly established 
principles he was “decidedly against the intervention of the armed forces in politics, 
yet… there are cases when it is fully justified... ”105  
Surely, Ibáñez shifted rapidly towards the socialist discourse of the time, as he 
saw that some of his supporters were involved. In this sense, he considered that the new 
government required all cooperation “for the justified hopes for social vindication.” 
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Ibáñez considered himself as a “spiritual member of the triumphant regime,” as well as a 
loyal friend of Dávila and of other members of the Government. He foresaw that the 
struggle against the reaction would surely be very hard, but he truly believed that in the 
end “if you only move towards a moderate socialism” the triumph could be secure. He 
also warned Dávila that if there were no effective propaganda campaign throughout the 
country, their program could fail. Ibáñez feared the reaction of the rightist forces, since 
“with all their great material resources, experience, skill and immoral tactics ... they will 
hinder the development of your plan, first surreptitiously and then their economic, 
financial, political and social opposition could make it impossible for you to govern.”106 
On the 12th of the same month, Ibáñez wrote to Joaquín Fernández107 
congratulating him for his appointment as new Mayor of Santiago. In that letter, he 
justified the fall of Montero’s government for a new one that promised “justice and social 
good.”108 He affirmed to Fernández that a respectful socialism of “well-earned rights” 
would have to go forward in Chile, “however many snags arise and however many times 
it trips.” Key pillars would be Puga109 and Dávila, as they were men of good intentions 
and well prepared.”110  
Nevertheless, Ibáñez foresaw that things could go wrong due to the ambition of 
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Grove, his former comrade-in-arms. He recognized his great abilities, but also felt he 
needed to be subdued, otherwise “if he is let loose, he will ruin the best effort… who 
knows if with the country soaking in blood… and the best values of the new era 
perverted.” This is why Ibáñez insisted that that “Don Marma” –as Grove was known– 
needed to be restrained as otherwise he would “take off and no one will be able to avoid 
his downfall.”111 
The unstable situation continued, as Carlos Dávila in a new successful coup on 
June 15 assumed full powers and exiled Grove and Matte to Eastern Isle. Ibáñez sent new 
telegrams, this time to Carlos Dávila in the President’s Office and Arturo Puga in the 
Ministry of Interior.112 He also wrote to Arturo Merino Benítez113 about his declarations 
in the Wiken magazine, where Merino had characterized Ibáñez as incapable of taking a 
risk on an enterprise that “albeit uncertain, meant, on the other hand, the salvation of the 
fatherland.” Ibáñez took this accusation seriously. Even though it is impossible to 
speculate if his conduct was determined by his indecisiveness, his determined patriotism, 
or his personal interest, his response to Merino is worth citing at length, as he seems to 
take a somehow different position on the coup d'état to the one he declared to Carlos 
Dávila: 
[It was] proposed to me [to overthrow Montero] 2, 3, 5 times and each of 
those times I refused to do it… I have never claimed that I am the right 
person for extraordinary undertakings. Nor have I refused to take risks… 
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to confront all dangers and all responsibilities… I have never denied my 
cooperation to anything useful provided it would not contradict my 
convictions as citizen, solider and man… It is true, I am not a man for 
the undertaking that you proposed… I have scruples and I am devoted to 
political–military principles that prevent me from cooperating in de facto 
procedures against a public power elected in proper popular election… 
Whether or not the choice is right, it represented… the sovereign intent 
of the Nation and I will never go against that sovereignty. What’s more, I 
am still opposed to the military overthrow of a de facto Government that, 
once established, has followed the normal rules of law.114 
Ibáñez also took the opportunity to reprimand Merino Benítez the debt he had with their 
old friendship. However, he recognized in him “all the worth of my fatherland where, 
unfortunately, its poor regimes and worse governments have undermined even the noblest 
virtues of our race.” Nevertheless, Ibáñez acknowledged Merino’s virtue of character and 
force of will, but wished he could only control his political impulses “and hold to your 
noble mission.” As in Grove’s case, Ibáñez feared that Merino’s political abilities could 
betray him. Proof of this was Merino’s interview, published in the Wiken magazine, in 
which he called on the Army to mutiny.115 
At the start, it appeared that the coup might make it possible for Ibáñez to return 
from exile. The Minister of the Interior of the Junta, General Puga, authorized him by 
phone to return to the country. However, Puga later changed that decision, causing a 
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serious problem.116 For Ibáñez this indecision was unacceptable and in a spur-of-the-
moment decision, he went back to Chile. His letters show his emotional state: he could 
not stand being away from his family any more, though he was willing to make any 
sacrifice for them. Ibáñez considered his situation unfair and decided to take a chance by 
traveling secretly to Chile despite Puga’s prohibition to avoid drawing protests. 
Unfortunately, according to Ibáñez, two of his friends revealed his secret.117 
Was his family his only reason for entering the country? A letter to Luis Schmidt 
reveals Ibáñez’s troubled mood.118 He noted that he had entered the country at some 
point in July “with no commitment to anyone,” just one month after Montero’s overthrow 
and with the desire not to meddle in politics. However, things did not go as planned.119 
Ibáñez´s supporters had thought that since Davila had been an old supporter of their 
natural leader, his ascension to power could only mean that as soon as Ibáñez arrived, 
Davila would transfer the post to him.120  
However, Davila had no intention of resigning nor of permitting Ibáñez to enter 
the country. Colonel Arturo Merino Benítez, commander in chief of the Chilean Air 
Force, not only had instructed the airports to deny landing permission to any airplane in 
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which Ibáñez flew, but he also banned the selling of tickets to him from the National 
Airline.121 In view of this, he contacted some of his family and friends, who sent him a 
passport under the name of Domingo Aránguiz, which he received in Mendoza.122 
Immediately after, he boarded the plane, having bribed one of the airline agents who had 
recognized him and warned him that he could not fly with false documents.123 As soon as 
Ibáñez reached Santiago, he headed for his late father-in-law’s house where his family 
was staying, just across Morande 80, one of the main entrances to the governmental 
palace.124 
Just a couple of hours after his arrival, the word had spread that he had arrived. 
Ibáñez waited patiently for Davila’s call.125 He later remembered that “hundreds visited 
me, civilian and military. There was no more room for the people in the halls of the 
house.”126 Some of his supporters actually encouraged him to cross the street and “take 
over” the governmental palace La Moneda, but it seems that Ibáñez found the situation 
unclear, and did not dare to do so. Some said that he had arrived too late.127 Others 
advised Ibáñez that he should first pay Dávila a visit, because, “due to the surprise of my 
[Ibáñez’s] trip, he had fallen ill.”128 
Ibáñez recalls that when he arrived at Dávila’s house, he first encountered Arturo 
Merino Benítez. Merino was very violent and warned him that the National Air Force did 
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not want to have anything to do with him. Ibáñez then met with Dávila, a discussion that 
almost ended in trompadas (punches). The conversation was long, and Dávila finally 
agreed to resign his position. Ibáñez would assume the Vice-Presidency, and Dávila, 
appointed in the new cabinet, would be in charge of preparing his presidential election.129 
Dávila warned Ibáñez that his intention was to give the country a new constitution more 
appropriate to the epoch in which they were living. Ibáñez granted such a possibility and 
in the meantime accepted control of the government because of the lack of authority in 
the country. Moreover, he thought that Chile had been living in a state of permanent 
convulsion. In addition, he believed the instability stemmed from his unlawful removal 
from power. 130 
Ricardo Donoso, one of the scholars who has deeply studied this period, says that 
at the time the country’s spirits were so demoralized that anyone bold enough and with 
the backing of the military forces could take power.131 Proof of this is that Ibáñez 
affirmed to Schmidt that when he arrived in the country, he could have taken over the 
government and caused new disorders and “political–military scandals.” 132 Once Ibáñez 
arrived in Chile, the commander in chief of the Army called all heads of the garrison of 
Santiago to decide on the position they should take about the return of the former 
President. After a long discussion, they agreed to make a statement to the press, declaring 
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that they had no relation whatsoever with the returning of the General.133 In light of this, 
Ibáñez foresaw that Dávila was being victim of the insatiable ambition of some 
“wretched comrades” of the Army and decided to return to Argentina, as he judge that the 
conditions were not propitious for his permanence in the country.134 In the meantime, 
Arturo Alessandri, knowing that his main political contender had arrived, did not 
consider himself safe and took refuge in the Spanish embassy for two days while things 
calmed down.135 
Upon his arrival in Buenos Aires, Ibáñez wrote to the director of Santiago’s 
newspaper El Imparcial. He requested the publication of a column he had written in order 
to clarify some information published there by one of his friends. He explained that he 
had vague knowledge of the activities of some of his acquaintances during Montero’s 
Administration, and affirmed that they misinterpreted the reasons for his return to 
Chile.136 He clarified that he had not been “taken to the country” as the publication said, 
adding surprisingly that his only purpose had been to return to his family after a 
prolonged and forced absence. He only wanted to live in peace and did not plan to engage 
in politics. Ibáñez felt that the given conditions “lacked any reward that might move me 
to intervene in the actual conditions.”137 
Davila’s administration had not presented conditions favorable to Ibáñez’s 
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repatriation to Chile, much less his return to power. Despite what had happened, Dávila 
appointed him as Ambassador in the Argentinean Republic just before he was 
overthrown. Ibáñez rapidly accepted the position, even though the move drew criticism 
from a certain sector of the Chilean public.138 It seemed that Dávila himself or some of 
his collaborators feared the political support surrounding Ibáñez. In order to stabilize the 
country and their power, they preferred to have Ibáñez as far away as possible from the 
political center. Ibáñez would never assume the diplomatic position. 
The letters in Ibáñez’s archive also give some insight into his changing situation, 
during the worsening of Chile’s political climate. Actually, Ibáñez had been able to 
reenter the country for a second time in the year in October 1932, once Bartolomé 
Blanche had assumed power (on September 13) and Dávila had been forced to resign. 
The vice-presidency of Blanche, which aroused so much optimism among the supporters 
of Ibáñez, alarmed the Allesandristas who demanded a civil authority to preside over the 
upcoming elections of October 30. By the end of September, rumors circulated that 
General Blanche would not hand over power so easily. In view of this, a “constitutionalist 
civil front,” originating in the northern city of Antofagasta, demanded that Blanche resign 
his post to the President of the Supreme Court, Abraham Oyanedel.139 
The situation continued to be critical, as the events that followed the downfall of 
Blanche´s administration. This activated a campaign against Ibáñez that made it 
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necessary, at least until things settled down a little, that Ibáñez strictly retire from public 
life. Ibáñez sought refuge in the farm of his mother-in-law. Isolated from the world, he 
traveled only infrequently to the nearest city of Linares. However, Ibáñez’s letters show 
how, despite being once again in Chile, he still felt alienated in his own country. He felt 
he could not go anywhere, not even Santiago, where one of his married daughters lived, 
whom he had not visited since he had returned. Ibáñez felt as though he was living “a 
monk’s life… doing odd jobs here in Linares… if it were not for the lack if money, I 
would have moved abroad for many years.”140 
The new political scenario did not intimidate Ibáñez and, in fact, he remained in 
the country. In November 1932, Conrado Ríos141 wrote him about his return to “the 
bosom of the fatherland.”142 Two months later, on December 28th 1932, Ibáñez responded 
that he would be happy to receive him at Panguilemo where he was staying: “If you come 
by train, please let me know two days in advance so that I can wait for you and transport 
you from Talca to Santa Rita.” Ibáñez knew that he was being watched, and he warned 
his friend that the roads were replete with policemen.143 
However secluded he remained, Ibáñez was aware that his presence in the country 
provoked unrest and worried his enemies. Thus, Ibáñez decided to take action. In 
September 23, he wrote a letter to the editor of El Imparcial asserting that he had 
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repeatedly advised his friends, considering always the superior interest of the Republic, to 
abandon any idea of conspiracy to overthrow the government. Believing, as he did now, 
that he was serving the Republic, Ibáñez now encouraged his followers to organize and 
become a political entity “on the basis of ideas and principles that I deemed and do deem 
adequate to the political, social and economic situation that the country is living.”144 
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3. Coerced by the “Lion”: Ibáñez’s Exile during Alessandri’s second administration 
In the elections of October 30, 1932, Alessandri defeated the candidates Hector 
Rodríguez, Enrique Zañartu, Marmaduke Grove, and Elías Lafertte. Due to Alessandri’s 
election, Conrado Ríos wrote to Ibáñez informing him that long before Alessandri arose 
as a possible candidate, he had had the opportunity to meet him during lunch at the home 
of Inés Echeverría.145 At that time, they both agreed that if they had reached an 
agreement between Alessandri and Ibáñez during the latter’s administration, the 
“democratic regime that both incarnated would have been saved… This is the truth and 
you well know that I have always believed the same.”146  
Ibáñez was glad to hear that, but he said that the problem had been “that passions 
can outweigh patriotism and the convictions of public good.”147 Actually, this does not 
seem so surprising. Alessandri’s biographer Robert Alexander recalls that his former 
private secretary Arturo Olavarria, affirmed that Ibáñez supported many of Alessandri’s 
principles, as including his enactment of the Labor Code and the creation of tribunals to 
solve problems between workers and employers.148  
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TABLE 2: Result of the elections held October 30, 1932149 
     
Candidates Number of votes Percentages 
Arturo Alessandri 187,914 54,78% 
Héctor Rodríguez 47,207 13,76% 
Enrique Zañartu 42,885 12,50% 
Marmaduke Grove 60,856 17,74% 
Elías Lafertte 4,128 1,20% 
René Montero’s testimony also helps understand Alessandri’s thoughts on Ibáñez 
in a more comprehensive way. Ibáñez, who had been receiving contradictory information 
from other informants, wrote to his former secretary asking him if he could clarify what 
had happened in the meeting he had with, at that time, elected president Alessandri.150 
Montero responded, first, that he had sent a detailed account dated November 7, 1932, 
and that he knew that he (Ibáñez) had not received it. Second, Montero explained that, 
due to his pressing situation151 he had come forward and talked to Alessandri to reach an 
amicable solution. Third, Montero took the opportunity to bring up Ibáñez in the 
conversation.  
Alessandri confessed to him, “What a great ruler would emerge if the qualities of 
Ibáñez and mine could be melded!” Then he added, “on behalf of the truth, he (Ibáñez) 
totally lacked of some of my qualities, and that he (Alessandri) lacked in a certain way, 
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some of what Ibáñez could spare.” Montero and Alessandri agreed that Ibáñez had 
continued many of the social and political policies of his first administration, although the 
latter denounced the arbitrariness of the regime. Alessandri said that Ibáñez could have 
accomplished all of his policy goals within the constitutional mandate, and his error had 
been his departure from the Constitution and neglect for the rule of law. However, this 
and the humiliations suffered by his family and himself, made him engaged against 
Ibáñez “with all the strength of my spirit.”152 
Given the disputes between the two, it is no surprise that the arrival of 
Alessandrism to power brought new problems to Ibáñez. In February 1933, Ibáñez wrote 
a confidential letter to the Director General of the Internal Revenue Service in response to 
a summons he had received regarding the payment of his taxes. First, he apologized for 
not being able to obey the summons because he had nothing to declare, especially since 
he had spent a large part of the year outside of the country; and secondly, because he 
considered it improper and discourteous to sue him, a former president, in that way.153 
Ibáñez then affirmed that his only income had been his Army retirement pension decreed 
in June of 1932, and although he did not know the exact amount, he said that according to 
the balance he received from the Armed Forces retirement fund, it totaled 3,150 pesos 
monthly, less 970.29 pesos for taxes, insurance and other deductions. He also declared 
that he owned a country house in Ñuñoa (just outside Santiago), some small property in 
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the coastal city of Cartagena, and a small farm in Linares.154 
In early March 1933, Ibáñez once again wrote to Conrado Ríos and reasserted the 
attitude he had adopted about party politics, assuming a position totally estranged from 
politics:  
I have not only put all such activities aside, but I have also wanted, and I 
am endeavoring, to completely sever those ties. I want my supporters, if 
any, to forget that there is a General Ibáñez, which is convenient if they 
want to try to bring to light the truth about my acts in office and restore 
the merited prestige that my administration deserves, the purest, most 
conscientious and most efficient administration that Chile has had in the 
last 30 years…155 
Ibáñez did not blame the presidents who had preceded him in the office, but rather 
the political maneuvering that besieged them and kept them from acting. In his letter, 
Ibáñez also recalled the sacrifices that he had endured to “clean up the field and govern.” 
His desire to “renew” Chilean politics during his administration, was now the main 
reason for the extreme cruelty of his opponents towards him. Although Ibáñez knew that 
the Government watched and investigated his acts daily, he lamented that the time and 
resources used to this purpose could be used to prevent real problems.156 
General Ibáñez’ personal and economic situation became increasingly unstable 
especially because of the fears and political intrigues of his detractors now in the 
government –starting with Alessandri himself. One of the things that most concerned 
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Ibáñez was to assure his family’s wellbeing, as he worried about finding a place to work 
and taking advantage of that year’s crop. He searched for a farm to lease in the province 
of Maule, “hopefully as far away as possible from the train line,” that could also prove to 
be profitable. He intended to work with Cayo –his eldest son Carlos from his first 
marriage–, and help him find a situation where he could earn a living without using the 
retirement pension, “since that might disappear any day given the spirit of legality and 
justice dominating political leaders.”157 
Despite his seclusion from the world on the family properties owned by his wife 
and his lack of participation in politics, Ibáñez still had to go into exile during the early 
part of May 1933 because –as explained in the letters– of political intrigues against 
him.158 It was the enactment of an extraordinary powers’ law, requested by Alessandri’s 
Administration, that again drove him into exile. The only “condition” that Ibáñez manage 
to negotiate, was that his retirement pension payment –his only income at the time– be at 
the official exchange rate. That was why he asked Pedro Letelier159 to intervene in favor 
of his brother in-law Enrique Letelier160 or his son Carlos, so they could make the 
appropriate arrangements for the deposit of his pension in Buenos Aires. The General 
requested that they pay it “in full” because, as he mentioned in the letters, Buenos Aires 
was extremely expensive at the time and he did not have the means to support himself. 
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The Government’s representative agreed to Ibáñez’s conditions. 161 
 Resigned once again to his new life in Argentina, he begged that his request be 
handled with urgency, because, he feared that the scarcity of resources would force him 
to move to Mendoza in a few months to be closer to his family and where he could live 
more inexpensively.162 He also regretted that he could not travel to Europe in his current 
situation, a lifelong dream. The letters also show that Ibáñez knew that the best solution 
was to reside in Buenos Aires and find a suitable occupation that could increase his 
income and permit him to live with his family. This was essential at least until Chile was 
calm and he could enjoy “the relative freedom to which all men are entitled.” The 
General regretted that “an absolutely unfounded suspicion and jealously makes my life 
impossible, even though I am completely retired since I left the Government.”163 
Three months later, Ibáñez wrote to Alfredo Estevez, manager of the Army and 
Navy Retirement Fund, because he had not yet received a cent.164 In early August, he 
received a letter from the Treasury General of the Republic informing him that they had 
processed his pension payment for the months of May and June.165 July and August 
would also arrived more than one month late as in future occasions.166 
Graciela –Ibáñez’s wife– accompanied him into exile to Buenos Aires. Ibáñez 
recalled in one of his letters that “she wanted at all costs to bring me here and she is no 
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condition to be contradicted.” This was a reference to the fact that Graciela was once 
again pregnant, and why he preferred that she went back to Santiago so she could be with 
the children and her mother. The General believed that he needed first to rebuild his life 
there before he could explore the idea of bringing them to Argentina.167 Several months 
later, in August of that year, he wrote to Gabriel Letelier grieving that he would not be 
able to see his new daughter born in mid-October.168 
In Buenos Aires, Ibáñez tried to remake his life by opening an office that 
imported Chilean products. He considered that there should be a good market for lumber, 
chickpeas, lentils, sulphur and several other products since a “good profit can be made on 
the exchange rate that can be shared with the people who cooperate in this venture in 
Chile.”169 He started some of the businesses with Vigorena,170 García Larraín and three 
Argentine friends.171 
The situation that the General experienced, despite his disillusionment with 
politics, did not make him forget his country He viewed with distrust the prevailing anti-
military sentiment and the attitudes of Alessandri. Regarding the latter, he criticized his 
paradoxical attitude thusly: “in the name of civility, he is militarizing the upper classes 
with the help of the State [Republican Militia172] as a means to substitute the regular 
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institutions of the Armed Forces.”173 As a former member of the armed forces, Ibáñez 
foresaw the threat of a paramilitary organization, even if it was “consecrated from the 
balconies of the Government Palace.”174 In a letter to Gabriel Letelier he highlighted how 
“curious” it seemed to him, that “that the same President who in his first administration 
invited the Army to deliberate [1924-1925], had become, by fate, a spokesman for 
antimilitarism.”175 This attitude of Alessandri's “reactionary regime,” convinced Ibáñez at 
the time that his administration would not conclude its term due to an eventual and 
unavoidable armed confrontation. 
The situation for Ibáñez became more tense by the end of the year, as he learned 
from Antonio Varas Espinoza, former editor of the newspaper La Patria in Concepción 
and later editor of Los Tiempos in Santiago, that the newspaper La Opinion had published 
a letter under his name on November 5, 1933.176 The missive, addressed to an Antonio 
Fernández Reyes, presented a vindicating vision of General Ibáñez’s administration. 
Since this publication disturbed the Alessandri Administration, through the Chilean 
Consulate in Buenos Aires the Government summoned Ibáñez and notified him of a 
“resolution” of the authorities that would lead to serious consequences for him. Although 
the sources do not inform us what the resolution was about, nor which serious 
consequences it had for him (it is probable to think that they threatened or even 
                                                                                                                                                 
Valdivia Ortíz de Zárate, Las Milicias Republicanas. Los Civiles En Armas 1932-1936 (Santiago: 
Dirección de Bibliotecas Archivos y Museos, Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 1992). 
173 Letter from Carlos Ibáñez to Humberto Arce, July 7, 1933 
174 Letter from Carlos Ibáñez to Humberto Arce, July 7, 1933 
175 Letter from Carlos Ibáñez to Humberto Arce, July 7, 1933 
176 Letter from Antonio Varas Espinosa to Carlos Ibáñez, November 8, 1933 
45 
 
suspended the payment of his pension). Ibáñez was enraged and sent a telegram to the 
Minister of National Defense denouncing the sanctions enforced by the Government as 
improper.177 However, two days later the Minister answered him that the Government 
had given him all the facilities to reside abroad “in deference to your own tranquility and 
to avoid the inconveniences that political activities involving you caused to public 
tranquility.” The Minister also objected that the letter published was not been declared 
false. This was particularly important for the Government, since it demonstrated Ibáñez’s 
willingness to undertake new political activities that the Administration thought “harmful 
to you and may disturb the order and tranquility that the Government is obligated to 
maintain with firmness.”178 
The outcome was that Ibáñez sent a tough letter in response to the Minister of 
National Defense. First, he said that naturally he had to read the letter since it was 
impossible to declare it a fraud without reading it. Second, he categorically denied 
authorship, and stated that he did not understand the reasons that might have led its 
authors to contrive such a document. Nevertheless, he later added that “except for the last 
paragraph, there is nothing in its substance that does not interpret what I feel and 
think.”179 
The paragraph that Ibáñez did not agree with was the one, which expressed that, 
“the reactionaries… are trying to destroy my [Ibáñez’s] work. They are wrong:  Chile 
could return to a dictatorship, but its undefined progress cannot allow the times’ of 
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Barros Luco and Sanfuentes to ultimately triumph.”180 Here Ibáñez was alluding to the 
vices of the parliamentarian system that had prevailed after the civil war of 1891, and that 
had actually caused the breakdown of the political system in the years 1924-1925. 
Furthermore, Ibáñez alleged that there was nothing in the published letter that could be 
considered contrary to public order or intended to incite a revolution, and that the 
freedom to publish and speak was guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution and the 
laws. 
Ibáñez’s letter to the Minister not only revealed his intentions but vented his 
frustration. The fraudulent letter thus became “the straw that broke the camel's back.” 
Bothered by the attitude adopted by the Government, the General told the Minister that, 
“there is not only a desire to attack me in all this, but also to use me as an instrument to 
mitigate errors and avoid responsibilities.” Ibáñez firmly believed that the time had come 
to break his silence and to defend himself. He now refused to accept the inaccuracies and 
the offenses of the senior government officials, “unless the truth and motive behind my 
acts are established and the reasons and outcome of the biased campaign that has sought 
and has thus far been successful in twisting them.”181 
Remembering the events of July 26, 1931 when his political persecution had 
started, Ibáñez recalled his serene attitude towards the events taking place. According to 
him, he had stoically faced the limitless overflow of political passions, and refused 
despite the loyalty of the armed forces, to use the public force to contain the disorders. 
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Claiming that he had resignedly received the slander and offense of his enemies, he had 
impassively contemplated the results of their ambitions. Ibáñez regretted that his enemies 
had cleverly exploited his silence as a sign of his confession and guilt. He asserted that he 
was conscious that most of his compatriots were undoubtedly unaware that, when he 
wanted to enter the country to address the charges against him, the Government had 
forbade him from doing so. This prohibition continued – Ibáñez highlighted– even when 
“the so-called Investigating Commission of the Acts of the Dictatorship was declared 
dissolved,” and even though he had written to President Montero begging him to appoint 
a new Commission, that would continue “the most meticulous investigation to its 
completion.”182 
Ibáñez decided to avail himself of the opportunity to reproach the Minister for all 
of the various actions against him, even the most ridiculous ones made by his enemies. 
One of many such statements was that because he managed a stable, he thought he was 
capable of managing the Republic, a clear reference to the moment in his military career 
when he was Commander of the Calvary regiment. Lastly, he recalled that the 
government did not help, but rather forced him to leave the country and that the 
“assistance” that the Minister allegedly provided, was “to avoid the inconveniences that 
political activities involving me caused to public tranquility” and of which he was 
entirely unaware.183 
It is impossible to evaluate the merit of these accusations against Ibáñez and if the 
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Government was using him as a scapegoat. However, it is also equally impossible to 
know how involved Ibáñez was in the political conspiracies in Chile, at least by the 
documents conserved in his archive. According to the Government, on January 3, 1934, 
both Grove and Ibáñez were planning a plot to bring down the Alessandri Administration. 
The government took care to publicize significantly compromising letters between the 
ring leaders of the new conspiracy and then presented the information to the Judiciary.184 
On January 26, 1934, Ibáñez responded to the charges in a letter to the Special 
Prosecutor, Pedro Silva. What is particularly striking is that in this letter, Ibáñez uses the 
same tone with which he had previously used in the letter to the Minister of National 
Defense. Ibáñez denied all accusations in a ‘strong and clear manner, [and asserted] that 
he was already accustomed to being “attributed the direction and paternity of every plot 
that it was believed convenient to dismiss with a mathematical regularity.”185 In view of 
the Minister’s insistence on issuing a new summons, and due to the prohibition imposed 
against Ibáñez’s entry into Chile, he answered the Special Prosecutor with a defiant tone. 
He was willing to obey the call of justice and would do so immediately, if the 
Prosecuteor lifted the obstacles to his entry, “more so when the government… has 
adopted diverse measures... precisely at times that you have publicly summoned me.” 
Even more, Ibáñez asserted that the Minister of the Interior had given the order to 
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Panagra Air Navigation Company not to sell him plane tickets to Chile.186 
One might assume that the intention of the government in all the accusations 
against Ibáñez  –true or not– was logically to discredit the General among his supporters 
and the general public by making him look like a man with limitless ambition who was 
only interested in returning to power. If that were the intention, it was somewhat 
successful. Renato Valdés, for example, who had been a fierce supporter of the General 
until then, wrote to ask if the accusation of conspiracy could be true. He received in 
response a letter in which Ibáñez said that he was deeply surprised that he, “who knows 
me well and knows my way of thinking, would have believed and judged as true those 
conspiratorial rumors and those absurd falsehoods devised and seasoned by the 
Government itself to persecute, bother and offend me impudently, malevolently and 
shamelessly.”187 
On February 22nd through Luis García Larraín, Ibáñez sent a pamphlet to the 
Chilean press entitled “General Ibáñez, former President of Chile, defends himself 
against the persecutions of Mr. Alessandri’s Administration.”188 Ibáñez explained 
Alessandri’s policy of conceiving accusations against him, and he charged that the 
government’s own failures were causing the country’s uneasiness. Ibáñez knew that the 
government intended to leave him without his retirement fund and continue to postpone 
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his possibility of coming back to Chile. He was convinced and decided not to think about 
returning, as Chile suffered the consequences of a “truly malignant tumor that the 
presence of Mr. Alessandri represented,” for as long as “El León” had freedom of 
political action in the Republic.189 
The persecution of opponents by Alessandri’s administration also reached beyond 
Chile into Argentina. Through the Minister of Foreign Relations of Chile, the Argentine 
Ministry of the Interior received a request for the “internment” of the Chilean citizens 
General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, Pablo Ramírez190 and Agustín Vigorena. The 
argument forwarded was that they were in bordering provinces of the country and that 
they had participated in a plot against the constituted authorities of the Republic.191 The 
Chilean government appealed to “international doctrine” and the Montevideo Treaty so 
Argentina might take measures to prevent the exiles from performing acts that could 
compromise the good relations of the international community. They requested that 
neighboring countries restrict the places of residence of the refugees, so they would be as 
far as possible from the borders.192 General Ibáñez as well as Agustin Vigorena appealed 
the resolution, which put them further away from their fatherland. Undoubtedly, it also 
placed them in an uncomfortable situation in the country that had given them shelter. The 
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Argentinean government only lifted the restriction after January 25, 1937.193 
Several years later, when Ibáñez recalled these events in an interview to Luis 
Correa Prieto, he remembered this passage. His recollection, however, is not consistent 
with the account above. First, he thought that it might have taken place in 1932 when it 
was actually one year later. Second, in the interview Ibáñez also recalled the request for 
“internment.” However, he adds something excluded from other sources. It seems that the 
Alessandri’s administration also requested that the Chilean exiles should stay also away 
from the Federal Capital. The probable reason was to isolate them from politicians and 
people of influence and even from Chileans who visited and lived in the capital. 
Additionally it might restrict their access to resources. In the same interview, Ibáñez 
claims that the Argentine Minister of the Interior, Leopoldo Melo, told him that if the 
Chilean government insisted on its demands, they (the Chilean exiles) should move to the 
barrio de San Isidro, “a suburb of the city that left him outside the radius of the Federal 
Capital.”194 This kind of influence was what the Alessandri’s administration wanted to 
avoid, pushing the Chilean exiles, mainly Ibáñez, away from the center of power. 
While his detractors had not forgotten him, the situation in Argentina seemed to 
be changing. On April 18, 1934, an Argentinean officer of the court, Ramón M. Alcina, 
appointed Carlos Ibáñez as a judicial trustee of a 75,000-hectare ranch. The ranch was 
located in Catriló, on the eastern Pampa of Argentina at more than 550 kms from Buenos 
Aires near the town of Carhué. The officer of the court assigned Ibáñez ample authority 
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to collect interest on the assets, to issue receipts, to make leases and perform any type of 
function.195 The General, who was not a stranger to either the field of administration, 
engaged himself completely in the new enterprise entrusted to him. However, when his 
employment did not go as expected, Ibáñez presented his resignation nearly one year 
later, after approval of the statement of accounts submitted by the trusteeship on May 31, 
1935. As he recounts in his report, he faced a number of challenges, including changing 
weather, lost harvests, and little support from what seems to have been a sort of 
agricultural cooperative organized as a colony.196 
Commenting to his former personal secretary René Montero about this enterprise, 
Ibáñez said that there were strong interests behind the ranch in Catriló. However, this did 
not mean he had solved his economic problems though his salary would help him 
overcome better his expenditures. Regrettably, the Alessandri administration accused him 
once again of plotting a coup against the government and suspended the payment of his 
pension. Now, his only means to subsist were his own meager savings. However, he 
believed that “it could be the time that Justice remembers me… restoring what is owed to 
me… hopefully before I have to live on the streets.” Regarding the new accusations, 
Ibáñez commented and insisted that he was no longer involved in politics, especially after 
the last outrages that had left him without his pension. No longer would he defend 
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himself even if “all conspire against me.”197 
There is little information from Ibáñez’s correspondence for the years 1935, 1936 
and 1937. However, he did leave a small diary that runs from mid-April to July 15, 1935 
revealing  general information about his daily life. He was living in an apartment at 
Viamonte 1345. It had two rooms and a bathroom, a hall, a relatively good-sized dining 
room “beside a small gallery through which the sun shown at certain times.” It also had a 
gas stove, a room for a maid and a bathroom with a shower, “both small and dark that 
appeared unfit for human beings to live in.” There was hot water all year round and a 
heating system that in winter worked until 10:00 p.m.198 
Noteworthy in the diary is Ibáñez’s ongoing contact with other Chileans, former 
collaborators of his like Vigorena or Ramírez, and some who were just passing by and 
wanted to meet with the former President of the Republic. During this period, Ibáñez’s 
diary makes continuous reference to his wife, who accompanied him in this exile. He 
went out walking with her or to see movies, such  as When Love Dies. They were always 
going out to have dinner with friends. Some of those outings made him remember his 
country and they had a “very good time, but I ate a lot and felt ill from the afternoon into 
the evening.” There was always someone enthusiastic about proposing a business, such as 
organizing a Chilean-Argentine oil company to exploit oil fields near Chaco.199 However, 
the recurrent subject was undoubtedly the situation and news from Chile. The diary 
reveals how Ibáñez worried and constantly soughts any news of his country. 
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In his memoirs, Aquiles Vergara Vicuña provides another insight into Ibáñez’s 
exile in Argentina. Through an epistolary exchange started at the beginnings of 1936, he 
shows how an additional interest had captured his old acquaintance’s attention: 
Paraguayan-Bolivian relations.200 During Ibáñez’s administration, Vergara was a member 
of his cabinet but had finally fallen away from him in 1927 due to political 
disagreements. Their discrepancy had increased as the former published a two-volume 
book called Ibáñez, César criollo at the end of 1931.201 In the words of one historian, this 
book caused quite a stir.202 Vergara’s opportunism to publish a book in which he attacked 
his former superior, only discredited himself. Soon after Ibáñez’s downfall, Vergara 
undertook a self-imposed exile in Bolivia from where he never returned. There he built a 
prominent position in the army of that country (he fought in the Chaco War), and become 
an activist for the vindication for Bolivia’s rights for a corridor to the Pacific.203 
The ideals that at some point made them work together, once again appealed to 
Ibáñez and Vergara. Through a common Chilean military acquaintance that lived in La 
Paz but traveled regularly to Buenos Aires, the General suggested that Vergara write him. 
The latter was surprised and incredulous given what had happened six years earlier, 
especially after the publishing of his (insidious) book. However, the contact insisted that 
the ex-President had read it and had commented that, he “was right on many of my 
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assertions, and even if I disagreed and rejected others.” Ibáñez understood how he came 
to those erroneous conclusions, both by circumstances and by the vehemence of 
Vergara’s character.204 Taking this into consideration, Vergara, who until that moment 
did not see any immediate reason to address Ibáñez, questioned the purpose of the 
General to his Chilean military acquaintance.205 
Ex-President Ibáñez, Vergara explains in his memoirs, was aware that in Bolivia a 
new movement was emerging among young progressive intellectuals and ex-combatants 
of the Chaco war.206 The origins of this movement were in “the trenches and sufferings of 
the conflict,” and from its inception it promoted a new social conscience and a new 
economic nationalism focused on maritime reintegration. Vergara added that Ibáñez 
believed that this new ideology found support in a strengthened, trained and proven 
military organization, and it would not be long before it moved toward a goal of Bolivia’s 
regaining a port on the Pacific by the taking of Arica. This no doubt would be particularly 
dangerous to Chile.207 
It is a fact that Arica had never belonged to Bolivia. Bolivians, however, had 
always considered that port a natural projection of their territory to the Pacific Ocean. In 
the nineteenth century, they had unsuccessfully tried to negotiate its acquisition from 
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Peru in exchange for other territories.208 Nevertheless, in Bolivia there was the long 
lasting idea that Chile would anything to jeopardy its development given existing 
resentment of the outcome of the War of the Pacific (1879-1884). The port of 
Antofagasta was never a reliable possibility for Bolivian takeover, since by time the 
Chilean troops occupied it in 1879 during the war, the Bolivian population there was less 
than 5% (the rest of the population was in fact Chilean). Therefore, to believe that 
Bolivia’s stagnation started with its landlocked condition after the 1879-1884 conflict is 
an error.209  
Aquiles Vergara was certain that during Ibáñez’s long exile in Argentina, he had 
gained interest in the political evolution of Bolivia. According to Vergara, this concern 
went back to his last administration, when Ibáñez had signed with President Augusto 
Leguía of Peru the Treaty of Lima of 1929. This treaty had ended the last pending 
bordering disagreements from the War of the Pacific between the two countries. 
However, Vergara believed that Ibáñez’s conscience troubled him because Bolivia, the 
other country involved in the conflict, was excluded from the negotiations and that Chile 
had compromised the wellbeing of its neighbor. Chile had added an annex to the treaty 
that stated that the governments of Peru and Chile could not, without prior agreement, 
transfer to a third power (Bolivia) all or part of the territories occupied by Chile during 
and after the war. This left Bolivia with no possible solution to regaining a port on the 
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Pacific.210 Nevertheless, Aquiles Vergara was incorrect in suggesting that the former 
President if not precisely remorseful by his behavior in the matter of the treaty, he 
seemed determined to rectify its most visible pernicious effects on Bolivia.211 Chile and 
Peru had done nothing other than protect their mutual interests, but Bolivia and Vergara 
saw this as one step further in the goal to reach an outlet to the sea. 
In a letter dated May 22, 1936, Ibáñez made Aquiles Vergara understand that the 
restoration of their old friendship should be based on negotiation with higher-ranking 
officers of the Bolivian Army to seek a mutual understanding between the two 
countries.212 Vergara contacted the respective authorities and analyzed Ibáñez’s offer. 
Unfortunately, Vergara does not tell us what kind of solutions were proposed, but he says 
that they finally decided to go forward with the talks. However, later Vergara submitted a 
dissenting opinion given that one of the parties was somewhat “out of play,” since Ibáñez 
was in exile, and that situation was unlikely to change in the near future. Now, Vergara 
believed, Ibáñez lacked official political influence, though he recognized that he had a 
wide influence on the Chilean public opinion.213 
The political circumstances in Bolivia was going through severe political 
upheavals due to problems resulting from the Chaco War. This situation prompted 
Vergara to hasten any possible understanding. Soon after, President Tejada Sorzano was 
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forced to leave power after a coup d'état led by Major Germán Busch. Immediately after, 
the latter installed in the presidency one of the military men who was conducting the 
negotiations with Ibáñez.214 This radically changed the picture. Vergara explains how the 
new president, David Toro (the same one Ibáñez supposedly met at Buenos Aires), bound 
by the rules of procedure of foreign relations that are common to heads of state, 
suspended any unofficial approach and entrusted Vegara to take the matter to the new 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia215. 
The change of course in the political situation of Bolivia made it impossible for 
any attempt to go forward with the negotiations. The newly assigned Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Enrique Baldivieso, explained to Vergara that he thought that Chilean President 
Arturo Alessandri already suspected what had happened behind his back and that could 
create a delicate situation to the new regime. Moreover, after 1935, President Alessandri 
and the President of Argentina were jointly conducting a peace treaty between Bolivia 
and Paraguay.216  
In light of this, Vergara offered Baldivieso on behalf of General Ibáñez, to 
suspend the dialogue that “could have led to closer correspondence between the Bolivian 
and Chilean General.”217 Vergara wondered at the time that if in the future Ibáñez “whose 
political horizon was far from being overshadowed,” would be consistent with the 
concept of revision of that “fateful wretched agreement forged by him in the Appendix of 
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the Treaty of Lima.”218 However, he regretted that that Ibáñez did not maintain his 
altered view but went back to previous position. Prove of this was that years later, and 
with Ibáñez once again as head of state, Vergara highlighted that in various statements 
Ibáñez insisted on “a narrow and myopic view” of the maritime aspiration of the 
neighboring nation, a “desire that some years ago he had estimated fair and had 
encouraged eloquently and decisively.”219 
What were Ibáñez’s truly intensions behind his approach to Bolivian military? It 
is hard to believe that he might have had any remorse regarding the understanding that 
his administration reached with Peru as refer by Vergara. Even more, of his foreign 
policy, the Treaty of Lima of 1929 constituted one of the main achievements of his 
government. It is also inconceivable why any Bolivian authorities went ahead with the 
talks, taking into consideration that Ibáñez as Vergara pointed out was at all moments 
“out of play” in his exile in Argentina. Was Ibáñez stubbornly looking to open an 
international front to Alessandri’s administration? Ibáñez’s archive is silent about this. 
By October 1936, Ibáñez left the apartment in Buenos Aires and moved back to 
an old boarding house where he had lived before. In December, he returned to a house in 
the Pocitos sector and in mid-January 1937, the Argentine Government lifted the 
prohibition that had restricted his free movement through Argentine provinces. In early 
January, Ibáñez went to Uruguay. Upon his return to Argentina, he wrote to Conrado 
Ríos to say that what El Debate newspaper had published in that country could only be a 
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“move” by the Alessandri Administration, as the article linked him to communist 
activities. 
This had logically given some sectors of the Argentine press reason to make 
disparaging comments about Ibáñez and his Government, and that was why “I was the 
subject of very tight police scrutiny for some time, my most minor activities were 
controlled as if I were a very dangerous criminal.”220 This made the General regret that in 
1925 he had confronted the responsibilities of bringing Alessandri back after he had been 
overthrown, and so he could implement “his beautiful program of justice and social 
vindication that he had promised in his campaign of 1920.”221 Ibáñez then insisted that 
his actual situation “was one of the worst: politically, economically and socially, because 
I could not live with my family and had to raise my children far from me and their 
mother.” Lastly, he regretted that it had been a mistake not to organize a civil force that 
would take over the legacy of the revolution of January 23rd of 1925, which had 
consolidated his political role and ideals, and the government program that he had 
designed.222 
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4. Final considerations 
By mid-1937, Ibáñez was able to return permanently to Chile. Once settled, he 
wrote to his old comrade and friend, Julio Salinas, who had stayed in El Salvador after he 
and Ibáñez had completed a military mission there at the beginning of the 1900s. In the 
letter, he summarized what had happened and what the last six years had meant to him. 
Ibáñez expressed that after he had left power in 1931, an epoch of continuous disorder had 
reached the country, and Governments rose and fell in quick succession, victims of the 
prevailing confusion and chaos. The main causes of these problems had been, he then 
added, the struggles of the different political currents over the predominance of power.223 
Ibáñez also expressed an awareness that many of his close collaborators and friends 
had suffered during this period. Even he had had to pay the price, not only of being unable 
to return to the country and to his family, but also not being able to defend the 
achievements of his administration and the honor of the people that had worked with him. 
He said that “only now, after six years, I can return to my people, to finally meet my 
youngest daughter that I had only met by a photograph, and my other one that follows her 
in age and that I left when she was only three months old.”224 
Regarding his future, Ibáñez explained that he had resigned from all political 
activity, “as my desires are to live serenely within my family the years that I have left of 
life.” He had no desire to be an “obstructionist” factor in the political turmoil in the 
country. His sole desire was that in the next presidential election, the country could find 
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someone “honest, patriotic, and able to meet the needs of the people.”225 
Just a couple of months later, Ibáñez, the man “who had no political desires” was 
proclaimed presidential candidate for the 1938 presidential election. As Rene Montero 
pointed out to him in a letter in June of 1932 in which he advised Ibáñez not to return to 
country, “To hate you with all the venom that the human heart can summon, or to lift him 
up as an emblem of salvation,”226 he would continue for an indefinite period to be a public 
man. In fact, Montero added, “In this you are more naive than the country. You are still 
admired, feared or hated, so you are not indifferent to Chile. You should, therefore, give up 
your condition of simple citizen and think about how the public man best serves his 
country.”227 His apparent retirement from politics did not convince his adversaries –and 
even his own supporters–, that he would henceforth remain on the margins of politics. 
Was Ibáñez the same man in 1937 as the ex President who had left in 1931? At 
first, his exile had turned into a desperate defense of his fallen administration. Then, he had 
made considerable efforts to return and stay in the country, despite his internal dichotomy 
if to engage once again in politics. Finally, at a last stage, he realized that his political ideals 
were much more than his fallen administration. His apparent disgrace, his “absence” that 
had made him a somehow invisible and omnipresent actor, led him to be proclaimed 
presidential candidate shortly after he had returned to the country in 1937. He was not just 
the candidate of any group, but of the neo-fascist movement. 
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The events that followed Ibáñez’s presidential candidacy ended in a somehow 
confusing incident of which the public opinion held him accountable. Young members of 
the National Socialist Party –of the same neo-fascist movement that supported Ibáñez 
candidacy– conducted a putsch (September 5, 1938) to overthrow the Alessandri’s 
administration just two months before the elections were held. The armed men divided in 
two groups, occupied the main buildings of the Universidad de Chile and of the Seguro 
Obrero, the latter just across the street from La Moneda. Their hope was that other 
subversive groups would join their efforts following their initiative. Soon they realized 
that their effort had been in vain. After the police fired a canon against the main doors of 
the University, the first group surrenders their arms and the building. The police forces 
made them walked a couple of blocks with their hands up as a sign of surrender, and into 
the other building where their comrades were still locked upand where they had to 
convince them to lay down their arms. It was then, that Alessandri gave the order to the 
police that there should be no survivors. The putsch was a total fiasco and Ibáñez’s 
responsibility never clarified. Sixty-three young men in their early twenties were killed and 
Ibáñez, who had no active participation at least in the events, withdrew his candidacy. 
The 1938 elections was, for the first time in Chilean history, the election in which 
left and right, as political ideologies of right and wrong, confronted. For the rightwing 
parties, Alessandri gave his obstinate and full support to his former Finance Minister, 
Gustavo Ross Santa María. The left on the other hand, following the political strategies of 
popular fronts designed after the VII Congress of the Communist International, proclaimed 
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the candidacy of Pedro Aguirre Cerda. These fronts, the where organized by the local 
Communist Party of each country, had as main mission to arrange wide political fronts of 
“progressive forces,” in order to confront rightwing and fascists fronts. It had triumphed in 
France in 1935, and in Spain in 1936 it ultimately led to the civil war. This is why it was 
more surprising that when Ibáñez pull out his candidacy, he gave his decisive support to 
them. His supporters did not question his position. Ibáñez´s political ideals, as in his first 
administration, crossed over the whole political spectrum. 
Finally, returning to that lunch held in Buenos Aires in the 1930s, we can see that 
the profound social and political transformations of the era were what led to the emergence 
of leaders such as Vargas, the Peron, the Trujillo the Ubico, and Ibáñez. These were times, 
which called for profound social and political transformations. Not all of these leaders were 
military men, and not all reached power by non-democratic means to impose their ideas. 
They did not even have a common project, although most were nationalists. However, all 
their countries suffered the ravages of political systems in crisis exacerbated by economic 
turmoil. All these men tried in one way or another to take advantage of their personal 
and/or national interest, and in doing so, they inevitably transformed Latin America. 
Ibáñez´s exile and how his absence from the country played a fundamental role in his 
transformation, may help better understand the character these men played in the political 
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